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Preliminary Statement

APPELLANT HOWARD HUNTER SNOW files thissupplemental brief through Order
of this Court that the Magistrate conduct further proceedings and ultimately to issue a
memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law that reflect that the best interests of the
children are served by the final JUDGMENT RE: MODIFICATION entered January 30t\ 2014.
Idaho Appellate Rule 13.3 (b) reads in salient part, "the district court or administrative
agency shall have jurisdiction to take all actions necessary to fulfill the requirements of the order
ofremand." (emphasis added). In remanding the instant case, this Court specifically ordered
"further proceedings" (emphasis added on plural).
The unambiguous instructions of this court obliged the Magistrate to conduct regular and
proper proceedings to accurately find the facts and to ensure that those findings were supported
with conclusions of law reflecting the best interests of the children.
Instead, the Magistrate conducted a hurried 5 minute Status Conference where he
summarilydenied Howard the right to discuss the issues of fact, the right to depose Dr. Engle or
otherwise be heard in any meaningful way. As a result, Howard was denied due process of law.
Not surprisingly, the Magistrate's findings are a mechanical recitation of theobservations
found in Dr. Engle, and not facts found by the trial court (emphasis added). Such exercise does
not constitute fact finding,and is an abuse of discretion which cannot be allowed as supporting
the determinative outcome in this case.
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THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
THE EVIDENCE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
In his AFFIDAVIT IN OBJECTION TO INTERIM ORDERS, Howard informed the
magistrate that he contested Dr. Engle's observations and recommendations in the report. The
report in that they contained numerous factual errors, omitted critical information, was anchored
in hearsay withoutsupporting factual documentation, was incomplete based on I.R.C.P. Rule 719
3(d), and went contrary to Idaho's best interest standard (Clerk's Record. Pgs 35-38).Prior to the
HEARING ON INTERIM ORDERS, Howard specifically asked the Magistrate to take note of
hearsay, bias, and inaccuracies in Dr. Engle's report(CR. Page 35, Item 9).
When hearsay becomes is so heavilyrelied upon by ancourt appointed expert such as Dr.
Engle, it does not automatically become admissible just because the expert relied upon those
matters or references in his report. The trial court in no way determined the veracity of Dr.
Engle's statements or the accuracy of the children's statements, e.g. whether Dr. Engle's
interviews Vvi.th the children were recorded, taken from his notes or merely his recollections.
The most apparent issue with Dr. Engle' s report is the lack of impartiality and improper
bias against Howard, who Dr. Engle described as being very "self-involved" and one who
constructs sentences "to convey ... an impression of his intelligence." (Exhibit #1, Top of Page
16). Dr. Engle then dedicates an entire paragraph linking Howard with "similar persons" who
"are very good at making positive first impressions" but tend to be "too loud,
exhibitionistic ... histrionic". (Exhibit #1, Top of Page 16).
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Instead of investigating the accuracy, clarity, and credibility of Dr. Engle' s report as well
as thequestionable supporting affidavits submitted by Hilary, the record clearly shows the
Magistrate bypassed thestep of ruling on the evidenceand quickly dispensed of the case by means
of the pre-trial stipulation:
THE COURT: "So the answer to the question is yes, you're no longer willing to - you're
no longer willing to abide by the agreement that you made to settle the case based on the
recommendations of Dr. Engle?"
MR SNOW: "That is correct."
THE COURT: "And on what basis are you trying to get out of that stipulation?"
MR SNOW: "Well, that Dr. Engle's report goes contrary to the Idaho guidelines for best
interest of the children." (Tr. Page 24, Lines 24-25; Page 25, Lines 1-12).

There is no question that the Magistrate must consider and identify all material facts and
carefully weigh the evidence before a fully informed and legally reasoned finding is made. In
the instant case the Magistrate did not view the evidence available, but chose to view a limited
and biased interpretation of the evidence taken through Dr. Engle' s report.
In the Magistrates Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, he notes that Dr. Engle was
appointed as an expert under Idaho Rules of Evidence 706. The rule, which, reads that the expert
"witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; a deposition of the
witness may be taken by any party."
While the case was temporarily remanded for findings of fact, the trial court failed to
conduct the necessary actions in order to determine the veracity of the evidence presented by Dr.
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Engle and simultaneously suppressing favorable evidence Howard had previously offered. In so
doing, the trial court abused its discretion.

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED BY ADOPTING DR. ENGLE'S OBSERVATIONS
WITHOUT JUDICIAL ADJUDICATING MATERIALISSUES OF FACT
Beginning with the key findings the Magistrate reveals that the trial court's findings are not a
preponderance of the evidence as is asserted, but merely a mechanical adoption of Dr. Engle's
findings. The Magistrate's findings begin by stating: "In Sum, Dr. Engle found as follows," and
thereafter he recites facts found only by Dr. Engle (FINDINGS OFFACT, Pg 5, Item 14). There
is no indication that there was a preponderance available evidence, or, more importantly, an
inquiry and investigation into the evidence that went into the report.
Included in the Magistrate's findings were critically weighted and erroneous findings
regarding the children's wishes:
"the children's wishes regarding custody were as follows: (i) Beman wanted to
resideprimarilywith Howard (ii) Hyrum wanted to live primarily with Hilary and (iii) the other
children were ambivalent about the custody schedule."(FINDINGS OF FACT Pg 11, Para 2).
This was not the case. Excepting Mac, all the children requested for a 50/50 custody
schedule (Exhibit 1: Top of Pg. 24).
With respect to Beman, he had expressed his desire to live with Howard full time only if his
mother moved away with his 3 brothers (emphasis added). A scenario inappropriately and
unprofessionally posited by Dr. Engle during his interview:
"I asked what he wanted to do assuming his motherrelocated and he said, 'I don't know, I
want to stay with dad in Boise"' (Exhibit 1, Bottom of Pg 25).
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Throughout the entire report, Dr. Engle inappropriately and unprofessionally used leading
questions that form the basis of his report and, ultimately, the Magistrate's findings:
"I asked if his father was talking about the conflict between his parentsa great deal and he
replied, "Yeah. Probably to inform us.' I asked how his exposure to theconflict made him feel"
(Exhibit 1, Bottom of Pg. 23)
"I asked if his father was talking badly about his mother and he replied, 'A little bit"'
(Exhibit 1, Bottom of Pg 26).

Howard had previously presented ample evidence to the Magistrate in his AFFIDAVIT IN
OBJECTION TO INTERIM ORDERS, asserting that Dr. Engle's report was biased,
unprofessional and was written in the best interests of Hilary and not the children's best interests.
In addition, Howard offered evidence to rebut the majority of Dr. Engle's assertions, however,
there is no indication that the Court read, considered it or weighed it when making its findings.
In overcoming the burden of joint custody and relocation, the court gave considerable weight
to Hilary's financial situation in Utah stating:
"In this case, the benefits of allowing Hilary to relocate with three of the children to Utah,
even contrary to their wishes, were (i) it would reduce the children's exposure to
parentalconflict which was adversely affecting them, and (ii) it offered more financial
stability to Hilary and Josef and derivatively to the children.In this case, the court concludes
nd
that Hilary has met her burden of proof. (FINDINGS OF FACT, Pg 12, 2 Paragraph)
Nowhere in Dr. Engle's report is Hilary's financial situation discussed, nor is there any
evidence in the record supporting these alleged financial benefits than Hilary's AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF INTERIM ORDERS. In overcoming the burden of relocation and joint custody
the Magistrate arbitrarily went outside the his defined set of evidentiary terms, cherry picked an
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item of hearsay from Hilary's Affidavit and gave it considerable weight without any supporting
documentation.
The trial court addresses the question the parties' character, but does so only in a general
sense, writing: "a comparison of each party's character favored primary custody of Mac, Hyrum
and Will with Hillary in Utah." (FINDINGS OF FACT, Pg 11 Last Paragraph). The Magistrate
fails to state the reasons why Howard's character was less favorable than Hilary's and how that
would translate into the children's best interests. Howard had previously pointed to the fact that
all of Hilary's letters of character reference came from immediate family members, and two
childhood friends, all of whom provided heavily biased points of view. In stark contrast, 3 of
Howard's letters came the boys' school teachers who had known both parties and the boys for
years; 2 others from upstanding members of the Boise community who knew all parties
involved.(CR.Pg. 35, Item 12, 2nd bullet point).
In short, the trial court relied purely on hearsay to overcome the burden of moving and denial
of joint custody in asserting that the decision was in the children's best interests.
This Court has consistently provided guidance on the inherent difficulties resulting from such
a mechanical adoption of proposed findings. Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861 (Idaho
1977).Matheson v. Harris, 572 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1977), The opinion in Comptonsupra held that
when prevailing counsel submits findings, it should not be treated as ultimate fact, but
considered by the court as "no more than informal suggestions for the assistance of the court."
(Citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,§ 2578 at 702-04 (1971).
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This Court's opinion inSchultz v. Schultz, 187 P .3d 1234 (2008) provides sufficient
guidance to the Magistrate's abuse of discretion in this case. In Schultz. this Court held that an
abuse of discretion occurs when the Magistrate fails to address "all of the relevant factors
impacting the custody decision should be considered and reflected in the record (emphasis
added).
In exercising its discretion in making a custodial determination, the Magistrate must have an
accurate understanding of the factors it deems to be material and all of the available evidence
supporting those issues. The Magistrate's findings can only be as robust as the facts on which
they are based. When material issues of fact are left unaddressed, the findings on which they rest
are extremely tenuous. In the instant case, the Magistrate erred in making Dr. Engle' s opinions
become the court's determinative facts. The Magistrate failed to show that it was trial court and
not, the court-appointed expert who became the ultimate decision maker.
The Magistrate's de facto adoption of an expert'sfindings without judicial investigation
impugns the integrity of the judicial system. By reflexively adopting Dr. Engle's findings the
Magistrate exposed the lack of careful consideration and legal reasoning through which the final
decision was reached.
In his supporting conclusions of law, the Magistrate entirely ignored any review of the
visitation schedule, and failed to support that the modification provided a satisfactory basis for
preserving and fostering boys' relationship with the Howard.Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929 (S.C.
2009)). Since the trial court failed to carefully consider fostering Howard's relationship with his
sons, the court abused its discretion. Danti v. Danti, supra.
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THE MAGISTRATE DENIED HOWARD DUE PROCESS THROUGH IRREGULAR
COURT PROCEEDINGS, ARBITRARY LEGAL REASONING AND DENYING
HOWARD TO BE HEARD IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY
IRREGULAR COURT PROCEEDINGS
Two days following the court's scheduling of the initial status conference to allow the
parties to discuss Dr. Engle's report, Hilary's counsel moved the court for INTERIM ORDERS.
In spite of the upcoming status conference, the Magistrate approved opposing counsel's request
to hold a hearing and argue to uphold the parties to the pre-trial stipulation, thus circumventing
due process and the opportunity for Howard to be fully heard on the matter.
After hearing briefly arguments centered around the pre-trial stipulation on January 2?1h,
2014, the Magistrate instructed Hilary's counsel to prepare the final order. (Tr. Page 29, Lines
24-25; Page 30, Lines 1-3) Only, after ruling and instruction for the preparation of the order did
the Magistrate vacate the conference that was promised at the pre-trial conference. (Clerk's
Record, Page 11, time-stamped procedure history).
These irregular and inconsistent proceedings denied Howard the opportunity to present
evidence, call Dr. Engle as a witness or be heard in any meaningful way. These unusual
procedures adopted by the court to dispense of the case quickly denied Howard substantive due
process.
ARBITRARY LEGAL REASONING
In answering this Court's ORDER FOR CLARIFICATION, the Magistrate asserted he
did not feel constrained to hold the parties to the pre-trial stipulation (ANSWER TO

11 -APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

CLAR1FICATION ORDER, Pg. 2). However, the record reveals just the opposite:through the
adjudication of the case, the Magistrate kept a single focus on the pre-trial stipulation and used it
as the solely as an enforcement mechanism.
The arguments at the HEARING FOR MOTION ON INTERIM ORDERS, centered on
the agreement at the pre-trial conference with Hilary's counsel opening the discussion
MR. MILLER: "Your Honor, what we are really doing is asking the court to enforce the
stipulation" (Tr. Page 23 Lines 9-10)
THE COURT: "So the answer to the question is yes, you're no longer willing to - you're
no longer willing to abide by the agreement that you made to settle the case based on the
recommendations of Dr. Engle?"
MR SNOW: "That is correct."
THE COURT: "And on what basis are you trying to get out of that stipulation?"
MR SNOW: "Well, that Dr. Engle's report goes contrary to the Idaho guidelines for best
interest of the children."
THE COURT: "There are no guidelines, it's completely discretionary and there are
certain factors that are to be considered. (Tr. Page 24, Lines 24-25; Page 25, Lines 1-12)
The Magistrate's comments at the HEARING ON MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENT reiteratehis same legal reasoning:
THE COURT: I think at the last hearingwhen you sought to get out from underneath
thatstipulation, I carefully measured the prejudice, aswell as your rights in the case and
balanced them indetermining that it wasn't an appropriate case to setaside the party's
agreement. I'lljust stand on therecord based on that prior analysis and respectfully deny
your motion" (TR. Pg. 36, Lines 3-10)
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Yet, when this Court asked the Magistrate for a clarification on his usage of the pre-trial
stipulation, the Magistrate answered that it did not feel compelled to hold the parties to it,
directly contradicting himself (ANSWER FOR CLARIFICATION, Pg. 2).
Once case was remanded back for proper fact finding, Howard asked the Magistrate for a
clarification on the pre-trial stipulation. In his response the Magistrateobfuscated, equivocated
and showed impatience:
MR SNOW: Just a point of clarification on the court 'sresponse to the Supreme Court, on
the pretrialstipulation, could you clarify for the parties whether omot that is in effect, has
that been set aside, or areyou still holding the parties to the pretrialstipulation?
THE COURT: I think the order of judgment wasentered has not been vacated or stayed.
MR. SNOW: Okay. So the pretrial stipulation is still in force? I would like -THE COURT: You're phrasing it "pretrialstipulations." I'm talking about the judgment
that wasentered based on your agreement.." (Tr.TR. Status Conference on Remand
11/24/14 Pg 6 lines 10-22,)

DENIAL TO BE FULLY HEARD
Not only do this Court's precedents on procedural due process rest on ensuring that the
facts have been fully heard and adjudicated, but universal principles of law support this
reasoning. It is an error to disallow a party not to be fully heard, especially when constitutional
rights are at stake, hence the Latin maxim audialterampartem; translated "hear the other side."
Hilton Jackson. Latin for Lawyers 127 (6th printing 2000).
In none of the proceedings, is there scant indication that the Court allowed Howard to be
fully heard, or be allowed to elaborate on the evidence supporting his objections to the Dr.
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Engle's report. In spite of Howard's AFFIDAVIT IN OBJECTION TO THE INTERIM
ORDERS, The Magistrate never gave any specific line of questioning to understand Howard's
side. In fact, there is no indication on the record that the Magistrate read any of Howard's
submitted affidavits as he never commented or questioned any of their content during the
proceedings.
Where the "evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be
faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice, or jealously," the individual's right to show that it is untrue depends on the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination. "This Court has been zealous to protect these
rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, ... but also in all types of cases
where administrative ... actions were under scrutiny."Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971).
It is well-recognized that "[a] fundamentally fair hearing requires the procedural steps of

notice, an opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to present evidence which is relevant and
material, and arbitrators who are not infected with bias"Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 75354 (1982)
By ignoring salient information, disallowing Howard to depose Dr. Engle, and failing to
inquire as to the rebutting evidence Howard had submitted, the Magistrate denied Howard due
process oflaw.

THE COURT: Well, when you say you're going tohave him testify in that regard, I'm
going to considerthe evidence I have to consider and that was the report.
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THE COURT: The sum and substance ofyouragreement was that the report would be
what I wouldconsider, so I'm not going to allow you to reinvent thatwheel.
MR. SNOW: Would you allow me to depose Dr. Engleand at least get clarification on
some ofhisconclusions?
THE COURT: I think since you're in the midst ofan appeal, that is something that will be
determined ifthere's a reversal. If there's a reversal and a remand,! think you'll have that
opportunity. (TR. Status Conference on Remand 11/24/14 Pg 7, Lines 10-25).

It is an abuse of discretion and extreme error to disallow the opportunity to depose an

expert witness. This abuse of discretion is especially egregious when the Magistrate deems that
deposition only necessary when this Court has determined a reversal. This is not the proper
usage of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and a denial of due process.

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO ESTABLISH A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST PRIOR TO INFRINGING ON HOWARD'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Constitutional right to privacy is guaranteed under the 4th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and requires a compelling state interest to establish reasonable infringement. The
Magistrate's advising Howard that his rights were "waived" by virtue of the pretrial stipulation is
preposterous and an abuse of discretion. (Tr. Page 34, Lines 9-10). Further, the Magistrate's
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW provides no supporting case law to
warrant such intrusion.
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While Idaho recognizes that the best interests of the children may serve as a compelling
interest, a court order cannot be upheld unless it is backed by substantial evidence and then
tailored to the least restrictive means possible.Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978).
This Court has never held that the "best interests of the child" gives a magistrate judge
the authority to record a father's sole form of communication 'Vvith his children andfurther, to
vest those recordings it in the hands of his former spouse. The Magistrate's ordering the
recording of a law-abiding citizen's conversations withouthis consent is hardly a "reasonable"
infringement, and there is no indication that legal reasoning was used to determine the least
restrictive means possible. Instead, the recording of conversations goes contrary the intent of
this Court's opinion in Danti. which requires the lower court to provide a satisfactory basis for
preserving and fostering the child's relationship with the non-custodial parentDanti v. Danti, 146
Idaho 929 (S.C. 2009)

CONCLUSION

This Court has stated that the lower courts must afford special weight to afit parent's
decision regarding the care, custody, and control of his childrenHernandez v. Hernandez, 265
P.3d at 499, 151 Idaho at 886.ln the case at hand, the trial court found Dr. Engle's findings
would suffice as being in the children's best interests, and that would be the end of it. The
record aptly demonstrates this. The magistrate thus failed to give the necessary consideration to
all the material facts and evidence ofthis particular case as is required by duty.
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Instead of taking the necessary steps to fill the requirements of the remand Order, the
Magistrate failed to do the work required of every trial judge confronted with objections to
evidence offered in a contested custody case. The Magistrate failed to carefully weigh the
evidence available to him, allow the appropriate parties to present evidence and depose,
ultimately showing that careful consideration was given to the fact finding process. In failing in
his judicial duties, he abused his discretion and the result is contrary to Idaho Code, and the
numerous opinions by this Court. Howard respectfully reiterates his request that the
JUDGMENT RE: MODIFICATION be vacated and the case be sent back to the lower courts so
that the best interests of the children will be served.

Howard H. Snow
Appellant Pro Se
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